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ACCESSING GENETIC KNOWLEDGE:
A CASE FOR A HUMANIST VIRTUE ETHICS
// DEVIN FLAHERTY
ABSTRACT // This essay presents an ethical argument for the value of taking a theoretical per-
spective that privileges the particularities of individual lived experience over a priori categories 
of subjecthood. This argument is made through the examination of one practice – disclosure 
–among American patients who have recently been diagnosed with Huntington’s disease, a fatal 
genetic disorder. Disclosure is understood in this context as the expected sharing of a Huntington’s 
disease diagnosis by the patient with those close to her (primarily family). It is modeled on the 
practice in which a medical professional informs a patient of her diagnosis. Through advancing 
an account of disclosure that constitutes it as an ethically obligatory practice within the realm of 
bioethics, the essay demonstrates that a particular set of ethical priorities is assumed by insisting 
on the salience of disclosure in the lives of patients diagnosed with Huntington’s disease. Two 
case studies are presented to illustrate that patients’ lived experience in the wake of a Hunting-
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In the era of genetic medicine, there exists the possibility of access to a new kind of knowledge: knowledge of the 
micro-physiology of your own, or someone else’s genes. 
This new possibility provides the chance to know about 
future harm that may come to you or your blood relatives 
in the form of a genetic disease. How can we best under-
stand the ethical questions entailed by this new possibil-
ity? Are patients who are given a genetic diagnosis also 
given new ethical obligations, for example, to share their 
diagnosis with their genetic relatives who may also be at 
risk? If so, how, and when are they obligated to do so, 
and what responsibility must they take for the outcome 
if they do choose to tell others that they are at risk? In 
considering this novel medico-ethical phenomenon, what 
kind of ethical framework is appropriate for capturing the 
situation of patients who receive a diagnosis of a genetic 
disease?
The individuals I study have recently been diagnosed with 
Huntington’s disease (HD) and live in Southern Califor-
nia. In this essay, I draw on case studies that were collect-
ed by my supervisor Carole Browner and her colleague 
Mabel Preloran during their 2010 study of the meanings 
and uses of genetic testing for patients suffering from 
degenerative movement disorder symptoms, their family 
caregivers and their clinicians. HD is inherited in an au-
tosomal-dominant fashion: if one parent is affected, there 
is a 50 per cent chance that it is passed on to the child. 
Although HD is congenital, it is typically a ‘late onset’ 
disease, and symptoms do not usually appear until middle 
age. First symptoms include movement disorder with loss 
of muscle control, shaking, memory loss, and personality 
changes. As it is a degenerative condition, the pathology 
aggravates over time. There is no cure, only palliative 
treatment, and it is ultimately fatal. Once symptoms start, 
individuals live for an average of 15 years.
When the individuals in this study were diagnosed, they 
acquired prognostic knowledge about their life course. 
Since the discovery of the first genetic test, the access to 
this kind of knowledge, both on the part of patients and 
on the part of those individuals the patient then chooses 
to tell has been the object of many studies in the social 
sciences. Very often, gaining access to this knowledge is 
framed as ‘disclosure’. The first disclosure, between the 
medical professional and the patient, necessarily entails 
the possibility of future disclosures between the patient 
and others. Once patients are informed of their diagnosis, 
they face the choice of whether to inform genetically-
related family members.
The question of what patients do in this situation is of-
ten explicitly framed as an ethical concern (Featherstone 
et al. 2006, Klitzman et al. 2007, Lehmann et al. 2000). 
The ethical dimensions of how, what, and when patients 
disclose their genetic disease have been problematised 
particularly in the case of disclosure to patients’ genetic 
relatives, who may, unknowingly, have the disease as 
well. By taking disclosure a priori as an object of study, 
we assume a biomedical ethical framework that assumes 
disclosure to be of ethical concern. However, this frame-
work may or may not coincide with the ethical commit-
ments and worries of the concerned individuals.
In this paper, I argue against a rendering of the ethical 
situation of patients diagnosed with a genetic disease that 
privileges disclosure as the focal point of ethical experi-
ence. I will suggest, in fact, that a focus on disclosure 
presupposes a moral framework that precludes an ex-
amination of the particular ethical experience of these 
individuals. In arguing for an investigation of the ethical 
valence of these individuals’ experience, what these indi-
viduals consider to be of ethical concern for them must 
be examined. This examination attends first and foremost 
to their experiences as first-person selves always already 
in the midst of the risk and vulnerability of everyday ac-
tion. I suggest that what might be seen from an outsider’s 
perspective as being ethically-charged (a locus of ethical 
decision making) may from a more experience-near per-
spective not appear to carry any ethical weight at all. In 
doing so, I respond to Cheryl Mattingly’s recent call for a 
more humanist ethical platform that is ‘equally attentive’ 
to both ‘moral traditions and already articulated practic-
es of subjugation’ and to ‘processes of ethical judgment 
grounded in singular events and the formations of selves 
who have their own particular history’ (Mattingly 2012: 
180). Here, I will strictly focus on promoting the latter, 
first-person component of this formulation, in an effort 
to re-balance ethical investigations in this field of inquiry 
that have largely focused on third-person analysis.
A HUMANIST VIRTUE ETHICS
Among the many voices that have come to the fore in 
the recent resurgence of directly attending to morality in 
anthropology is Cheryl Mattingly. In her 2012 piece ‘Two 
Virtue Ethics and the Anthropology of Morality’, Mat-
tingly’s call for a readjustment of anthropology’s moral 
focus draws our attention to the divergent assumptions 
underlying two ethical frameworks commonly employed 
by anthropologists. These are two varieties of virtue eth-
ics, which she argues have mistakenly been merged in 
recent approaches to the anthropology of morality. 
The first of these two virtue ethics is ‘third-person’ post-
structural virtue ethics, largely influenced by Foucault. 
The second is a ‘first person’ or ‘humanist’ virtue eth-
ics, drawing largely on Aristotle. The post-structural vir-
tue ethics, which she refers to as taking a ‘third-person 
perspective’ (Mattingly 2012: 169) is characterized by an 
ethical actor who is a subject produced by certain socio-
cultural and historical conditions, whose ‘self is not so 
much a cause as it is an effect’ (Mattingly 2012: 173). 
In this tradition ‘a dominant place [is given] to social 
structures in shaping the moral’ (Mattingly 2012: 175). 
The ethical work for individuals in this model consists of 
the ‘striving toward the occupancy of a ‘subject position’ 
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The ‘first person’ or ‘humanist’ neo-Aristotelean strain of 
virtue ethics, on the other hand, is concerned with a self 
‘identified with the very first-personal givenness of the 
experiential phenomena’ (Zehavi 2008 in Mattingly 2012: 
169). This model is concerned with the individual’s expe-
rience of what it is to be in the world from a first-person 
perspective, to ‘inhabit particular lifeworlds’ (Mattingly 
2012: 170). In this model, the ethical work for individuals 
is done by building a virtuous character through practice, 
which takes the form of actions in ordinary, everyday life. 
Central to this position, however, is that these everyday 
actions are precarious and risky through and through, and 
that individual human actors will never be able to truly 
control the consequences of their actions or the circum-
stances in which they find themselves. I will next show 
that taking disclosure as an object of focus in studies of 
patients diagnosed with a genetic disease is a case of ap-
plying a third-person, rather than a first-person ethical 
framework to their situation.
THE ETHICS OF DISCLOSURE
‘Disclosure’ is a term native to biomedical ethics. Canon-
ically taken in this framework to be an ethical imperative 
(Hertogh et al. 2004), disclosure is achieved when a pa-
tient is officially informed of her diagnosis by a medical 
professional. In the majority of studies of genetic diag-
noses, this model, in which one individual delivers a dis-
crete piece of information to another, has been implicitly 
laminated onto those who receive a genetic diagnosis and 
those they choose to tell or not to tell. In employing this 
term, authors index the biomedical ethical framework 
in which disclosure is an ethically pivotal action. This 
thrusts patients into a pre-established subject position in 
which they, upon receipt of their diagnosis, have a num-
ber of choices to make: who, when, and how to tell others 
of their diagnosis. Pre-determining that disclosure will be 
an ethically salient concern in these actors’ experience 
presupposes a particular subjectivity. In so doing, I argue, 
it takes the third-person perspective of post-structural vir-
tue ethics.
I suggest that the cultural saliency of disclosure and the 
dominance of the bioethical framework in all questions 
regarding disease has steered social scientists and other 
scholars away from a humanist, first-person ethical anal-
ysis of the way genetic diagnostic knowledge shapes, or 
fails to shape, the ethical experience of the patient.  Par-
ticularly, it presupposes that the receipt of diagnostic in-
formation is inherently a matter of ethical valence in that 
it necessarily changes patients’ ethical responsibilities and 
their understanding of their own ethical position. How-
ever, patients who gain access to such knowledge may 
not experience any shift in their ethical commitments or 
concerns. The institutionalised terminology of disclosure 
glosses over the possibility of ‘considering humans as 
“self-interpreting” moral beings whose perceptions, in-
terpretations and actions help shape moral subjectivities’ 
(Mattingly 2012: 171). Following Mattingly, I argue for 
attending to the singularities of each individual’s first per-
son perspective to improve our chance of grasping what 
the true ethical struggles for them are. 
Next I present the details of two cases of individuals re-
cently diagnosed with HD in Southern California. While 
both of these individuals had just had their positive HD 
status disclosed to them, the access to that knowledge did 
not entail finding themselves in the midst of a new ethical 
problem. I outline their first-person perspectives by way 
of sketching, however briefly, their particular lifeworlds. 
It will be illustrated that for these two patients, as for 
many others in the study, the knowledge of their positive 
HD status was not ethically valenced and did not consti-
tute a pivotal point in their ethical experience.
ANA1
When Ana received her positive test result for Hunting-
ton’s disease, she was 37 years old. Recently divorced 
with two school-aged children, she had been searching 
for a diagnosis for 14 years. In 1990, 17 years before the 
study took place, Ana watched her father die of what had 
been clinically diagnosed as HD (the genetic test was not 
yet widely available). Ana described watching her fa-
ther’s death with horror. The anxiety that she would one 
day suffer like him was a reason why she was searching 
for an HD test2. But Ana was not afraid for herself. Her 
two children, and her ability to care for them in the future, 
were her utmost concern: 
I was worried because I have the experience 
with my father and I know that HD could de-
stroy you, and my main concern is who is going 
to take care of my children. Nobody even with 
the best intentions could take care of them like 
me. I am the mother. It is horrible to think about 
these things…
Ana was devoutly Catholic and considered her fate to be in 
the hands of the Lord. For example, when an appointment 
at the neurology clinic that she had been set on attending 
became available at the last minute, Ana explained this 
as proof that ‘nothing is impossible for the Lord.’ Ana 
was also considerably depressed. She frequently attrib-
uted her depression to her situation as a fatally diseased 
mother who would gradually become less and less able 
to care for her children. Ana recounted having felt this 
way even before she received her positive HD test result, 
a testament to how certain she was of having the disease. 
When Ana received her diagnosis, her deep, continuing 
anxiety was mixed with relief and a renewed conviction 
1 This case was originally discussed by Browner and Preloran 
(2010: 37-47).
2 In the U.S., HD testing is never done as part of any routine 
clinical work-up. People are tested only if at least one blood rel-
ative is known to carry the Huntington’s gene or because they 
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in her own ability to interpret her bodily experience. Pre-
viously, Ana had felt that everyone she consulted or even 
told about her symptoms ‘thought she was crazy’. As she 
explained, ‘I wanted to have it [the test] because I knew 
that I have HD, like my father, but I couldn’t prove it. 
Nobody believed me.’ Importantly, it’s likely ‘nobody be-
lieved’ her because Ana did not in fact show any physical 
symptoms. While she complained of ‘sensations’ in her 
arms and legs, and of trouble walking and keeping her 
balance, no professional she saw conclusively observed 
these phenomena. Ana seemed completely normal, al-
though she was certain that she was not.
For her, disclosure of her disease was entirely expected. 
She had been searching for over a decade for a doctor 
who would take her claims of Huntington’s seriously so 
that she could have the test and begin treatment. Ana’s 
diagnosis did not provoke a new ethical problem, but pre-
cisely the opposite of what a bioethical or third-person 
virtue ethics might predict: instead of feeling burdened 
with responsibility, she felt vindicated and newly self-
righteous.
ROLAND3 
Roland was in his 50s when we met him at the clinic 
where he and his sister Mary had come to explore treat-
ment options for his recently diagnosed Huntington’s 
disease. Roland had been suffering from movement dis-
orders for many years, causing him to lose his job as a 
jazz musician and take up another as a taxi driver, until 
his rapidly declining memory forced him to leave that job 
as well. He became homeless for several years. It wasn’t 
until he was arrested for vagrancy that he called his es-
tranged sister Mary to bail him out of jail. Since then, 
Mary has been Roland’s devoted caregiver. 
Roland’s HD test result came when Mary, in her words, 
‘converted the entire family’ into believing that their 
mother had died of HD. Roland and his brother had begun 
showing symptoms Mary recognised as similar to those 
of their mother in the early years of her illness. Mary had 
teamed up with their brother’s wife to monitor the men’s 
behaviour, and the women had decided together that all 
the blood relatives ought to get tested. In an interview 
with Roland, we can see the influence Mary had on Ro-
land at this point in his life:
Int: Did the opinion of those close to you influ-
ence your genetic testing decision?
Rol: Yes, [Mary] was the one who thought I 
should get the test done in the first place.
Int: Can you tell me how it influenced you?
Rol: Well, she is the one who decided I should 
have the test.
Due to the experiential knowledge Mary acquired taking 
care of their mother in the last years of her life, Mary had, 
before having the family tested, begun bringing Roland 
to an HD support group. This is where Roland and Mary 
both learned most of what they knew about Huntington’s 
disease, including information about potential treatments, 
clinical trials, and generally how to best go about seeking 
treatment for this relatively rare disease.
By the time Mary decided Roland should be tested, his 
symptoms were severe. He had lost much of his memory 
and other mental capacities, and sometimes had trouble 
speaking. He also sometimes had difficulty controlling 
his movements. During interviews with Roland as well 
as during his neurological consultations, Mary played a 
significant role in navigating the interaction, often speak-
ing for Roland or encouraging Roland to speak. Mary 
also kept track of all of Roland’s medical records, helped 
him fill out medical forms, and took notes during appoint-
ments. 
Once Roland was diagnosed, Mary continued her prag-
matic approach to his treatment, embodying a can-do at-
titude, focusing on the things that needed to be done over 
the inevitability of Roland’s eventual decline: 
Int: Now that you have that information [the ge-
netic test results] how do you feel?
Mar: I feel that we made progress because we 
can concentrate on looking for help; search for 
treatment, look for some clinical trials…I like 
the fact that everything seems to be moving 
now.
Roland’s attitude, while perhaps not as upbeat, was none-
theless in tune with Mary’s apparent level-headedness. 
As Roland recounted:
I just assume whatever the test you take, the re-
sults will be known, negative or positive (…) 
Whatever is out there is going to be out there. 
It’s kind of 50-50, so. The way I see it, if I have 
it, somebody else doesn’t have it, so it’s not a 
real mind blower to get the news.
Neither Mary nor Roland were shaken by the HD diag-
nosis; both considered it to be a predictable result that 
fits into the life trajectory, or at least one of a few accept-
able life trajectories, that they already took themselves 
to be on. The moment of disclosure, for Roland, did not 
pose a significant ethical problem. Already in the midst of 
an incapacitating illness when he received his diagnosis, 
Roland did not experience this disclosure as a shift in his 
ethical responsibilities.  
ACCESSING GENETIC KNOWLEDGE 
AS AN ETHICAL QUESTION
 
I have presented here two cases of individuals who were 
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recently diagnosed with Huntington’s disease, a situation 
which might seem to weigh the patients with a certain 
ethical choice. What does one do with that knowledge, 
who does one tell, when, and how? I have argued that 
approaching the ethical question from this perspective is 
somewhat misguided in that it begins with the categories 
themselves instead of beginning with individual experi-
ence – a misstep, I believe, characteristic of a post-struc-
tural virtue ethics approach. The ‘ethical’ here cannot be 
captured by identifying subject positions that these indi-
viduals are striving toward, but rather only by attending 
to the unique specificities of each life and each character. 
Ana, depressed, horribly afraid of ending up like her fa-
ther and putting her children through the same pain she 
experienced, asymptomatic to any observer, is faced with 
a different ethical struggle than Roland, even though the 
two might be considered to be in the same ‘subject posi-
tion.’ 
When approached from the perspective of a humanist 
first-person virtue ethics, it becomes clear that every case 
of accessing genetic knowledge, even in the case of a sin-
gle disease like Huntington’s, will pose a different kind 
of ethical struggle with different ethical considerations. 
It is not helpful, then, to gloss the further sharing of this 
knowledge as disclosure which indexes an ethical system 
(biomedical ethics) that shares with post-structural virtue 
ethics a foregrounding of the individual merely as occu-
pying a certain subject role. Instead, we ought to attend to 
the access to this knowledge as part of the ‘central human 
predicament of trying to live a life that one is somehow 
responsible for but is in many respects out of one’s con-
trol’ (Mattingly 2012: 179).
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